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Abstract
Policy proposals often contain complex legal, technical, or scientific jargon making it
difficult for people to evaluate their favorability towards the policy. We proposed one
experiment testing the effect of language complexity on people’s evaluation of a policy
proposal as moderated by their initial policy beliefs. We hypothesized that when a policy
was consistent with one’s beliefs or if participants had no policy preference, they would
evaluate it more favorably when it was simple than when it was complex; when a policy
was inconsistent with one’s beliefs, they would evaluate it less unfavorably when it was
complex than when it was simple. Results confirmed our hypotheses. This demonstrates
that complex information does not always make people judge policies more negatively
but rather causes people to weigh complex information less heavily in their judgments.
Keywords: processing fluency, language complexity, policy attitudes, attitudes
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Language Complexity, Belief-consistency, and the Evaluation of Policies
In current American politics, it is extremely difficult for the average citizen to
evaluate policy proposals because they often contain complex legal, technical, or
scientific jargon. Although any policy proposal may contain complex language, some
issues are especially prone to complex language use because they consist of complicated
economic, technological, or scientific concepts. Such issues include taxes and
environmental conservation policies. Complex policy language is problematic for
American voters because it can interfere with their ability to discern whether a message is
consistent or inconsistent with their beliefs. The current experiment will test the
proposition that as issue language complexity increases, people will mistakably deviate
from their own policy preferences by rating preference-consistent policies less favorably
and preference-inconsistent policies less unfavorably than they otherwise would. The
findings from this experiment will help explain why Americans may vote against their
own policy preferences, pointing to the importance of policy communication and civic
education.
Issue Language Complexity
In order for citizens to vote according to their policy preferences, they have to
understand the corresponding policy proposals. Yet, research shows that most voters
agree that ballot initiatives are too complex to understand (Cronin, 1989). Therefore it is
not surprising that citizens are less likely to participate when they must vote for
legislation (which may be difficult to understand) rather than for a representative (Cronin,
1989; Everson, 1981). Magleby (1984) argues that the lack of voting on ballot initiatives
can be explained by the use of overly complex language. Thus, even for people who

LANGUAGE COMPLEXITY, BELIEF-CONSISTENCY, AND POLICY EVALUATION

4

participate, complex language makes it difficult for them to accurately gauge the extent to
which the policy lines up with their existing beliefs about whether or not the policy
should be implemented.
The research examining language complexity, also known as processing fluency,
has a very clear conclusion: information that people can easily process (e.g. simple
language) is judged more favorably than information that is difficult to process (e.g.,
complex language; for a review, see Reber et al., 2004). Although processing fluency has
been manipulated both perceptually (e.g. small font; Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012) and
conceptually (e.g. complex language; Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015; Shepherd & Kay,
2012), we focus on fluency as defined by the ease with which language is processed. This
is because of the clear relevance complex language has to the evaluation of policy
proposals.
In a series of experiments, Oppenheimer (2006) manipulated the language
complexity of three different kinds of text (personal statements, dissertation abstracts,
and philosophical essays) and had participants rate the intelligence of the author. In all
experiments, increasing complexity produced lower intelligence ratings (Oppenheimer;
2006; Experiments 1-3). The effect remained robust regardless of the actual quality of the
essay, or prior beliefs about the quality of the essay. Oppenheimer demonstrates that such
effects are at least partly driven by how easily people can process the information (i.e.
fluency). That is, complex language made the information difficult to process and
therefore affected people’s judgment of the supposed authors.
The effect of fluency on stock market prices provides a compelling real-world
example. Alter and Oppenheimer (2006) found that companies with fluent names
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performed better in two U.S. stock markets than companies with relatively less fluent
names.
Recent experimental evidence showed, compared to a simply worded policy, a
complexly worded policy reduced people’s likelihood of voting for that policy and led to
less favorable attitudes toward the policy (Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015). This finding
appears to be robust to whether participants agree or disagree with the underlying
message of the policy. In addition to reducing people’s likelihood of voting for a policy,
another series of studies found that complex language motivates people to avoid learning
more about the issue—an effect termed “the perpetuation of ignorance” (Shepherd &
Kay, 2012).
Based on such evidence, it would appear that complex language always leads
people to judge information less favorably. However, a more precise analysis suggests
language complexity determines the extent to which people rely on the content of the
message to inform their attitudes. That is, when the content of a message is simple and
easy to comprehend, people judge the message based on its merit (i.e., they take the
central route to persuasion) rather than on peripheral cues, such as the status of the source
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1986; Hafer, Reynolds, & Obertynski, 1996). When the content of a
message is complex, on the other hand, people rely more on peripheral cues to form their
judgments. For example, Hafer, Reynolds, and Obertynski (1996), found that participants
rated a simply worded message more favorably when it was strong than when it was
weak, meaning that they judged the message based on its merit. When the message
contained complex language, participants rated it more favorably when it came from a
high-status source than a low-status source, but the strength of the message had no effect
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on participants’ judgment of it. This supports the idea that, when the message language is
simple, people rely more on message content (e.g. whether one agrees or disagrees with
it) to inform their judgments but rely less on message content when the message language
is complex.
Accumulating evidence suggests that, rather than being positive itself, easily
processed information carries more weight in people’s judgments than information that is
difficult to process. For example, Shah and Oppenheimer (2007) presented participants
with conflicting (both positive and negative) information about an object and
manipulated whether the positive information was easy to process (low complexity) and
negative information difficult to process (high complexity), or vice versa. Participants
judged the object more positively when the positive information was relatively easier to
process but judged it more negatively when the negative information was relatively easier
to process. In other words, information that was easy to process had a greater impact on
people’s judgments.
The current experiment builds on previous research (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007;
Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015) by considering how people’s pre-existing policy preferences
alter the effects of language complexity on policy favorability ratings. As opposed to
using positive and negative information (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007), the current
experiment will demonstrate that people’s pre-existing policy preferences will determine
how language complexity affects their judgment of a policy proposal. Our proposed
mechanism is the same as previous research in this domain (Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015).
That is, complex language makes information difficult to process and therefore affects
judgment of the attitude object. However, rather than arguing that difficult processing
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always leads to more negative judgments, we instead argue that it makes people weigh
the information less heavily (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007). For example, relative to
simple language, complex language makes it difficult for people to process their
agreement with a preference-consistent message or their disagreement with a preferenceinconsistent message. That is, people’s judgments should be more extreme when the
policy is in simple language because it is easier for people to process their agreement or
disagreement with the policy. On the contrary, complex language makes processing
difficult and should therefore lead to less extreme ratings (i.e. preference-consistent
policies less positive and preference-inconsistent policies less negative). This would
suggest that the influence of language complexity depends on whether or not one agrees
with the policy.
We will extend the existing findings by manipulating whether or not a policy is
consistent with participants’ pre-existing policy preferences (consistent vs. inconsistent
vs. no preference) in addition to manipulating issue language complexity (simple vs.
complex) to test the hypothesis that people will judge a preference-consistent policy more
favorably when it is simple than when it is complex and will judge a preferenceinconsistent policy less unfavorably when it is complex than when it is simple. This is
because a simple preference-inconsistent policy can more easily be processed as
inconsistent with one’s current beliefs than a complex one. Likewise, preferenceconsistent information should be more easily processed and thus more likely to produce a
positive judgment when it is simple rather than when it is complex. When people have no
policy preference, we expect them to judge the policy more favorably when it is simple
than when it is complex (Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015). Because we expect the effect of
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complexity to reverse depending on whether the policy is consistent or inconsistent with
the participant’s initial policy preference, we do not expect a main effect of complexity.
We do, however, expect a main effect of policy preference such that preferenceconsistent policies will be rated more favorably than preference-inconsistent policies (e.g.
Edwards & Smith, 1996; See Figure 1).
Method
Participants and Power Analysis
Our preregistration can be found at https://osf.io/mrkv3/.1 Three hundred and
twenty seven participants (Mage = 35.82, SDage = 11.50; Male = 179, Female = 146, Did
not respond = 2) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (mTurk). The study
was restricted to participants in the United States who had completed a minimum of 100
tasks, and had a task approval rate of at least 85%.
We used the G*Power software to calculate our sample size (for details on the
G*Power software, see Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; See Appendix A for all
information we entered into G*Power). The methods used in the current experiment
closely mirror those of Shockley and Fairdosi (2015), which enabled an informed effect
size estimate to calculate a sufficient sample size. They found effects of complexity on
policy attitude with sizes ranging from Cohen’s d = .29 to d = .44. Although we did not
expect the 2 (Language complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency:
1

The Open Science Framework (OSF) preregistration at https://osf.io/mrkv3/ contains our primary
hypothesis of interest and the procedure used for the study. However, after receiving helpful
reviewer feedback, we made several additions to the analysis plan and to the procedure without
deviating from the analyses and procedure that were planned in the preregistration. Additionally, we
modified our goal sample size to accommodate the additional analyses. Because all hypotheses,
analyses, and procedures were approved before data collection (as per the rules of registered
reports) we mark such analyses as preregistered even though they contain additional information
than what was included in the OSF preregistration. A detailed explanation of the reasons for making
adjustments after completing the preregistration, as well as the analysis plan that was approved in
stage 1 of this manuscript before data collection, can be found at https://osf.io/dt2u2/.
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Consistent, Inconsistent, or No preference) interaction to be moderated by issue, we
calculated our goal sample size to retain at least 80% power to test the 2 (Language
complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: Consistent, Inconsistent,
or No preference) X 2 (Issue: Climate Change vs. Taxing Corporations) interaction with
an effect size of d = .365 (i.e. the average effect size in the range above). This power
analysis calls for 293 participants. Using a sample size that has adequate power to detect
the above three-way interaction ensured that we had more than adequate power to detect
the 2 (Language complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency:
Consistent, Inconsistent, or No preference) interaction, which was our primary analysis of
interest.
Because we expected to exclude participants for failing to pass the attention check
(Hauser & Shwarz, 2016), we recruited 327 participants in order to retain adequate
statistical power after excluding such participants. Participants passed the attention check
at a higher rate than expected: 6 participants (1.8%) were excluded for failing it (4 in the
simple condition, 2 in the complex condition). One additional participant was excluded
for failing to report their position on corporate taxes. To further ensure an appropriate
sample size, we set our minimum cell sample size to 15 participants for our primary
groups of interest (i.e. not including the no-preference category). We surpassed the
minimum cell sample size; the smallest cell sample size was 25.
Procedure
All materials and procedures were exactly as preregistered. First, participants read
an information page and complete a modified version of Zhou and Fishbach’s (2016)
remedy to participant attrition in which participants typed a sentence stating they will
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complete the full survey. Next, participants indicated their position on two political issues
(Climate Change or Taxing Corporations) and answered demographic questions.
Participants were then be randomly assigned to conditions. The current experiment used a
2 (Language complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: Consistent,
Inconsistent, No Preference) X 2 (Issue: Climate Change, Taxing Corporations) between
subjects design. Because the primary analysis tests the interaction between complexity
and preference-consistency, we collapsed across the two issues (however, exploratory
analyses examined the effect of issue, as described below). The survey software was
programmed to randomly assign participants to one policy that may be consistent,
inconsistent, or neither (i.e. when participants have no policy preference) with their
position on that issue. The policy was presented in either complex or simple language.
Participants then rated their attitude toward the policy.
Materials
Attrition remedy. First, participants read a general description of the study:
“Thank you for choosing to participate in this HIT! In this study we will ask about your
opinions on two political issues. We want to know what you think regardless of your
level of interest or participation in politics. There are no right or wrong answers. We just
want to know your honest opinions. Thank you!” Then participants completed a modified
version of Zhou and Fishbach’s (2016) attrition remedy on the next page, “Many mTurk
workers tend to quit once they see the tasks. If a sizable number of people quit the
survey halfway, the data quality of that survey would be compromised. However,
our research depends on good quality data. Thus, before taking this survey, please
make sure you do not mind completing the tasks described above.” Then participants
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were instructed, “Please type below ‘I will complete the full survey’ so that we can
ensure your data will be of high quality. Thank you!” and then there was a text box for
them to type the requested sentence and another that asked for their mTurk identification
number.
Policy preferences. Participants then rated their initial policy preferences by
selecting either For, Against, or I Don’t Know for both policies: “Are you for or against
legislation that would require corporations to pay higher taxes?”; “Are you for or against
legislation that would require businesses to report their usage of fuel and energy?”
Participants also rated the personal importance of each issue (1 = Not at all important, 7
= Extremely important).
Attention check. To ensure participants were not mindlessly responding, we
included a modified attention check question from Oppenheimer, Meyvis, and Davidenko
(2009). Participants were shown a block of text that appeared to be a question about the
kinds of political activities in which the participants engages. After three sentences, the
message instructed the participant to ignore the instructions and click on an option they
would otherwise never choose and ignore all other options (“Run for president of the
USA”; see Appendix B). Hauser and Shwarz (2016; Study 1) found that 95% of mTurk
workers passed a similar attention check whereas only 39% of subject pool participants
did. This supported our decision to recruit our participants from mTurk.
Preference-consistency manipulation. Belief-consistency was manipulated by
randomly assigning participants to a policy that was either “for” or “against” one of the
initial issues participants rated in the beginning of the experiment. We used participants’
initial policy position (i.e. For, Against, or I Don’t Know) to categorize them as having
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received a preference-consistent policy (for a policy they are for, or against a policy they
are against), a preference-inconsistent policy (against a policy they are for, or for a policy
they are against), or neither (when they marked I Don’t Know as their initial position; see
section below on Pre-processing steps).
Language complexity manipulation. Issue complexity was manipulated by
presenting the policy in either simple or complex language. Simply worded policies were
revised using a thesaurus and online dictionaries to replace simple words with complex
words. For example, the simply worded policy against environmental restrictions on
business (i.e. against addressing climate change) was “This initiative is to loosen
restrictions on businesses that suffer due to the spread of climate change information.
They will not have to report their usage of any form of fuel and energy.” The complex
version of this policy was “This initiative is to slacken circumscriptions on vendors that
have been writhing due to propagation of ecological data. They will not have to report
their expenditure of materials that lead to radiative forcing such as Chlorofluorocarbons.”
To ensure that the complex policies were more complex than the simple policies,
we submitted the policies to the Flesch–Kincaid readability test (Flesch, 1948) that
computes the ease-of-readability of a passage based on the total number of words,
sentences, and syllables in the passage. Complex policies had a much lower score (M =
21.7) than simple policies (M = 56.1), indicating they were more difficult to understand.
All versions of the policy proposals used in this experiment— along with their
corresponding Flesch-Kincaid readability test scores—are available in Appendix C.
We sought to corroborate our readability analysis of complexity by pretesting the
processing ease of all policies in the experiment. We recruited 65 participants from
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Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and randomly assigned them to rate either the four complex
(For and Against for each issue) or four simple versions of the policies2. Participants read
“While ignoring your own opinion on the message content, please rate your agreement
with each statement regarding each brief message. The questions aim to measure how
complex the wording is for each message” and then rated the four policies on processing
ease (see question in the section below). We conducted independent samples t-tests to
determine if there were significant differences in processing ease between policies with
simple versus complex language. In all cases, participants in the simple condition rated
each policy as significantly easier to process than participants in the complex condition
(all ps < .001; see Table 1). Further, we used a mixed ANOVA to test the 2 (Language
complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 4 (Issue: Climate Change Against, Climate Change
For, Taxing Corporations Against, Taxing Corporations For) interaction to ensure that
differences in processing ease for simple versus complex policies do not differ as a
function of which policy the participant was rating. The interaction was not significant,
F(3, 180) = .32, p = .812. Further, we collapsed policies across issue position (i.e. For vs.
Against) and conducted paired samples t-tests to determine if there were differences in
processing ease within complex and simple conditions. The difference in processing ease
was not significant within either the complex condition, t(30) = 1.67, p = .105, or within
the simple condition, t(30) = 1.57, p = .1273.

2

Three participants were removed from the pretest because of missing data.
It is worth noting that both t-tests are not very far from conventional levels of statistical
significance and are both in the same direction, showing that policies on taxing corporations were
somewhat easier to process than policies on climate change. Because the differences are not
substantial, we argue that it is sufficient to test if issue moderates the expected 2 (Language
complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: Consistent vs. Inconsistent vs. No
preference) interaction.
3
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Processing ease. The mechanism of processing ease was measured with one item:
“I can easily understand how this policy works” (1 = strongly disagree to 7 = strongly
agree; Shepherd & Kay, 2012; Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015).
Policy attitude. People’s attitude towards the policy was assessed with three
items adapted from Shockley and Fairdosi (2015): “Do you like or dislike the effect of
this policy on businesses?”; “Do you like or dislike the idea of this policy being put into
effect?” (1 = strongly dislike, 7 = strongly like); “Would you vote in favor or against this
policy?” (1 = definitely vote against, 7 = definition vote in favor). The items were the
same for both issues. All items were averaged to form an attitude favorability composite
(α = .97). Attitude favorability was the primary dependent measure.
Results
Pre-processing steps
Because our main analysis depends on participants’ initial views on political
issues, we first created our preference-consistency variable. For example, if a participant
was in favor of taxing corporations and received a policy that argued in favor of that
position, that variable was coded as preference-consistent. If they were in favor of taxing
corporations but receive a policy that argues against that position, that variable was coded
as preference-inconsistent. People who marked “I Don’t Know” on their assigned issue
were coded as no-preference. The same was applied to both issues.
Preregistered analyses
Initial analyses. We conducted an independent samples t-test to test if simply
worded policies were rated as easier to process than complexly worded policies (i.e.
manipulation check). Indeed, participants rated policies using simple language as
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significantly easier to process (M = 4.98, SD = 1.81) than policies using complex
language (M = 3.26, SD = 1.80), t(319) = 8.50, p < .001, d = .95, 95% CI [1.38, 2.05]
(one-tailed).
We conducted a between-participants ANOVA to test the 2 (Language
complexity: Simple vs. Complex) X 3 (Preference-consistency: Consistent, Inconsistent,
or No preference) X 2 (Issue: Climate Change vs. Taxing Corporations) interaction to
determine if issue moderated our primary analysis of interest (the Language Complexity
X Preference Consistency interaction). As expected, the three-way interaction was not
significant, F(2, 308) = .60, p = .552, η2partial = .004 (two-tailed). Because we expected the
effects of complexity to reverse depending on whether the policy was consistent or
inconsistent with participants’ initial policy preference, we did not expect a main effect of
complexity. However, the main effect of complexity was significant, F(1, 308) = 5.12, p
= .024, η2partial = .016 (two-tailed). In line with previous research (Shockley & Fairdosi,
2015), participants rated policies using simple language more favorably (M = 4.08, SD =
2.20) than policies using complex language (M = 3.84, SD = 1.61). As expected, there
was a significant main effect of belief consistency, F(2, 308) = 76.23, p < .001, η2partial =
.331 (one-tailed). Independent samples t-tests demonstrated that participants rated the
policy consistent with their preference significantly more favorably (M = 4.97, SD =
1.65) than when it was inconsistent with their policy preference (M = 2.84, SD = 1.65),
t(278) = 10.83, p < .001, d = 1.30, 95% CI [1.81, 2.46] (one-tailed), or when the
participant indicated no position on the issue (i.e. answered “I Don’t Know”) (M = 4.05,
SD = 1.50), t(180) = 3.34, p <.001, d = .62, 95% CI [.49, 1.45] (one-tailed). Additionally,
participants rated a policy on which they had no preference significantly more favorably
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than a policy that was inconsistent with their preference, t(176) = 4.04, p <.001, d = .75,
95% CI [.69, 1.64] (one-tailed). Unexpectedly, there was a main effect of issue such that
participants ratings on corporate taxes were significantly more favorable (M = 4.09, SD =
1.78) than ratings on climate change (M = 3.79, SD = 2.02), F(1, 308) = 5.09, p = .025,
η2partial = .016 (two-tailed). Also unexpected, the complexity X issue interaction was also
significant such that the simple effect of complexity on attitudes toward corporate taxes
was significant, but the simple effect of complexity on attitudes toward climate change
was negligible, F(1, 308) = 7.51, p = .006, η2partial = .024 (two-tailed).
Tests of main hypotheses. As per our preregistered hypothesis, we expected that
when participants receive an issue that is consistent with their policy preference, they
would rate it more favorably when it was simply worded than when wording was
complex. We expected the same effect for when participants rate an issue on which they
have no policy preference. However, we hypothesized that when participants rate a policy
that is inconsistent with their policy preference, they will rate it less unfavorably when it
is complex than when it is simple (see Figure 1 for our preregistered proposed results).
Because the 2 (Language Complexity) X 3 (Belief Consistency) X 2 (Issue) three-way
interaction was not significant, we collapsed across issue and conducted a betweensubjects ANOVA to test the 2 (Language Complexity) X 3 (Belief-Consistency)
interaction—our main analysis of interest. As expected, it was significant, F(2, 314) =
15.51, p < .001, η2partial = .090 (one-tailed; see Figure 2). To parse the interaction we
conducted three independent samples t-tests examining whether language complexity
caused significant differences in policy favorability separately for each level of beliefconsistency. As expected, when the policy was consistent with participants’ policy
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preference, policies using simple language were rated significantly more favorably (M =
5.78, SD = 1.35) than those using complex language (M = 4.42, SD = 1.62), t(138) =
5.24, p < .001, d = .92, 95% CI [.93, 1.80] (one-tailed). Likewise, when participants
indicated that they had no policy preference, policies using simple language were rated
significantly more favorably (M = 4.44, SD = 1.76) than those using complex language
(M = 3.68, SD = 1.12), t(43) = 1.73, d = .51, p = .046, 95% CI [.02, 1.50] (one-tailed).
Also consistent with our hypothesis, when participants rated a policy that was
inconsistent with their initial policy preferences, they rated the policy less unfavorably
when it contained complex language (M = 3.19, SD = 1.51) than when it contained
simple language (M = 2.48, SD = 1.72), t(133) = -2.57, p = .006, d = -.44, 95% CI [-1.17,
-.25] (one-tailed).
Mediation analyses. Next, as outlined in our preregistered analysis plan, we
sought to test if processing ease mediated the effect of language complexity on policy
favorability. We used the PROCESS macro in SPSS (Model 4; Hayes, 2013) to run a
simple mediation model separately for each level of belief-consistency (i.e. consistent,
inconsistent, or no preference). In each model, we entered language complexity as the
predictor (X; simple = 0, complex = 1), processing ease as the mediator (M; continuous),
and policy favorability as the dependent variable (Y; continuous) (see Figure 3). As
expected, when the policy was consistent with participants’ preference, complexity led to
lower policy favorability indirectly through processing ease as evidenced by the bootstrap
confidence interval that excludes zero (see Table 2 for all mediation results). The results
were the same for participants that received a policy on which they had no preference.
When the policy was consistent with participants’ preference, complexity led to higher
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policy favorability indirectly through processing ease, but the bootstrap confidence
interval overlapped with zero and is therefore not significant.
Exploratory analyses. We were interested in testing whether our main analysis
of interest (the complexity X belief-consistency interaction) would be moderated by issue
importance. We marked this analysis as exploratory because we were able to come up
with rationale for expecting that the interaction would be either stronger or weaker for
issues that were rated as more important. For example, it is plausible that the effect size
for issues rated as most important will be larger because when it is described in simple
language, participants should be more inclined to give it an extreme rating, thus leading
to a larger difference between complexly versus simply worded policies. However, it is
also plausible that the effect size will be smaller for issues rated as most important.
Important issues should be seen as personally relevant, which has been repeatedly found
to increase elaboration of the message content (Petty, Cacioppo, & Goldman, 1981; Petty
& Cacioppo, 1986). Thus, such close attention to highly important policies may reduce
the effect of complexity on policy attitude. Because issue importance could produce
plausible effects in opposite directions, it was difficult to make predictions and this
analysis was therefore considered exploratory.
In order to explore the potential moderating effects of issue importance, we
entered Language Complexity, Issue Importance, and two dummy variables for Belief
Consistency (reference category = No preference) into a multiple regression model. Issue
importance did not moderate Complexity X Belief-Consistency interaction as indicated
by the non-significant three-way interaction, (b = -.16, SE = .21), t(309) = -.77, p = .444,
95% CI [-.57, .25] (two-tailed). The Belief-Consistency X Issue Importance interaction
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was significant, (b = .40, SE = .11), t(309) = 3.63, p < .001, 95% CI [.18, .61] (twotailed). Unsurprisingly, the effect of belief-consistency (i.e. belief-consistent policies
rated more favorably than belief-inconsistent policies) got stronger as issue importance
increased, as denoted by the significant positive interaction term.
Discussion
Our results confirm our primary hypothesis that belief-consistency moderates the
effect of language complexity on policy favorability. That is, when participants received
a policy that was consistent with their beliefs, they rated it more favorably when it
contained simple language than when it contained complex language. The effect was the
same when participants had no policy preference, consistent with the prior literature on
the effect of language complexity that had not considered the role of pre-existing
opinions. On the other hand, when participants received a policy that was inconsistent
with their beliefs, they rated it less unfavorably when it contained complex language than
when it contained simple language. We also confirmed that processing ease mediated the
effect of language complexity on policy favorability when participants were rating either
a belief consistent policy or one in which they had no preference. However, processing
ease did not mediate the effect of language complexity on policy favorability when
participants received a belief-inconsistent policy. Additionally, neither issue (corporate
taxes or climate change), nor issue importance moderated our effects.
These findings contextualize recent research that demonstrates that complex
language causes lower policy favorability (Shockley & Fairdosi, 2015). That is, we
demonstrate that complexity lowers policy favorability only when the policy is consistent
with the participant’s initial policy preferences or if the participant has no initial policy
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preference. On the contrary, we demonstrate that the opposite occurs when the policy is
inconsistent with participants’ beliefs. In this case, participants rated a policy with
complex language more favorably (or less unfavorably) than one using simple language.
These results can be explained by Shah and Oppenheimer’s (2007) framework on cue
weighting. That is, information that is difficult to process (i.e. complex language) is
weighed less heavily in attitude judgment than information that is easy to process (i.e.
simple language). For example, complex policy language made it difficult for participants
to process their favor (or disfavor) towards the policy, making their attitudes less
favorable when they agreed with the policy and less unfavorable when they disagreed
with the policy. In short, their attitudes became less extreme. These results extend
previous research (Shah & Oppenheimer, 2007) by incorporating people’s pre-existing
attitudes towards the attitude object as opposed to novel positivity or negativity of the
information. Additionally, this extends the phenomenon of cue weighting to judgments of
policy favorability.
It is worth noting the variability in effect sizes. According to our framework, it is
plausible to expect that the difference in favorability between simple and complex
policies would be larger when participants have a pre-existing position on the policy
(preference-consistent or inconsistent) as opposed to when participants have no
preference. However, this was apparent only for belief-consistent policies, in which the
effect size was large. The effect size was actually smaller for belief-inconsistent policies
than for those in which participants had no preference. It is unclear why the effect size
was more than twice as large for belief-consistent policies than for belief-inconsistent
policies. One possibility is that the differences in effect size were partly due to where
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favorability ratings were when the policy contained simple language. For preference
consistent policies, the mean for the simply worded version was near the maximum value
of the scale (i.e. 5.78; maximum = 7). For preference-inconsistent policies, the mean for
the simply worded version was not as extreme relative to the minimum value of the scale
(i.e. 2.48; minimum = 1). Because our results showed that people’s favorability ratings
became less extreme when the policy was shown in complex language, participants rating
belief-inconsistent policies had a shorter distance to travel before they reached the
midpoint (i.e. the place they presumably would not cross as a result of complexity alone).
Although this may account for some difference in effect size, it is unlikely that it
accounts for a substantial portion of the large difference in effect size we observed. A
more plausible reason why the effect size was substantially smaller for belief-inconsistent
policies is because belief-inconsistent information is subject to more scrutiny than beliefconsistent information (see Edwards & Smith, 1996). Thus, this could reduce the effect of
complexity because people are dedicating more cognitive resources to scrutinizing the
belief-inconsistent policies, thereby making language complexity less influential in one’s
judgment. This might also explain why processing ease did not mediate the effect of
complexity on policy favorability for belief-inconsistent policies but did for beliefconsistent policies and those on which participants had no preference.
Limitations and future directions
A potential criticism of this work is that the wording of the complex policies were
inscrutable and therefore participants moved towards the center of the attitude scale
because of their total lack of understanding. However, this is unlikely because there was a
large main effect of belief-consistency, demonstrating that participants were in fact able
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to identify the policy as in line with their preferences when the policy was complex, they
just did so less strongly.
Additionally, it is not totally clear how this research reconciles with Menegatti
and Rubini’s (2013) findings that abstract messages are more persuasive than concrete
messages when the audience holds a similar position but concrete messages are more
persuasive than abstract messages when the audience holds a different position from the
speaker. Our experiment aimed to keep everything about each policy the same (including
level of abstraction) except for our two independent variables: language complexity and
issue-preference. Menegatti and Rubini (2013), suggest that abstract language is more
persuasive to an audience with a similar position to the speaker because having common
ground with the audience allows the speaker to rely more on figurative language. When
the audience holds a different position from the speaker or is heterogeneous, the speaker
has to bridge a gap in common knowledge and is therefore more persuasive when they
use concrete language. In our current experiment, all language was relatively concrete.
However, it would be interesting for future research to examine if the effect of language
complexity is different depending on the level of language abstraction.
Another limitation of this work is that we did not manipulate conceptual fluency.
That is, we manipulated language complexity while keeping the policy concepts
conceptually the same. For example, a conceptually complex policy would have many
working parts whereas a conceptually simple policy would have few. It is plausible to
expect that conceptual fluency works similarly to language complexity in that it makes
people weigh complex concepts less heavily in their judgments. A potentially fruitful
way to explore this would be to manipulate the conceptual fluency of several issues and
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gauge the importance of each issue participants assign to conceptually simple (i.e. fluent)
versus complex (i.e. disfluent) issues. Consider, for example, the issue of healthcare in
the United States. The same issue could be framed as relying on few factors (e.g. whether
our government decides to allocate the funds to it) or a collection of factors (e.g. whether
states decide to opt in, cutting funds from other programs, and projections of cost).
Additionally, it would be possible to use the same manipulation between issues. For
example, when people decide how much weight they place on a particular issue when
evaluating political candidates, they might place greater weight on issues that (at least
seemingly) rely on fewer factors (i.e. conceptually simple) than those that rely on several
factors (i.e. conceptually complex).
Another interesting future direction for this research would be to investigate the
role of complexity (and thus processing fluency) in defense of one’s policy positions. For
example, in her investigation of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair, Ahluwalia (2000) found
that when the information against then-president Bill Clinton was too difficult to refute,
Clinton supporters defensively reduced the weight they placed on negatively affected
traits (e.g. honesty) and raised the weight they placed on other traits such as Clinton’s
intelligence. It is plausible to expect that people defensively shift their reasons for
supporting a political candidate (i.e. the weight they place on a given trait or issue)
towards traits that easily come to mind (high accessibility) or traits that are otherwise
easy to process (high conceptual fluency). Because our findings demonstrate that people
weigh information more heavily when it is easy to process, people who are motivated to
maintain a positive view of their favored political candidate can defend their support for
the candidate by shifting the weight they assign to criticized issues and move the weight
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towards issues that are easy to process (e.g. has high accessibility, relies on few factors,
or if person has ample information on the issue).
In conclusion, communication of policy information is a critical factor in
determining people’s attitudes towards a policy. It is worrisome that wording differences
can have substantial effects on policy attitudes because “muddying the waters” (i.e.
making an issue more confusing) can become the tactic of unscrupulous political
partisans as a way of reducing support for a policy they are against. On the other hand,
simplicity of policy information can help garner support for important policies. The
current work sheds light on the importance of not only the content of a policy, but how it
is communicated.
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Appendix A
G*Power analysis
F tests - ANOVA: Fixed effects, special, main effects and
interactions
Analysis:
Input:

Output:

A priori: Compute required sample size
Effect size f
=
.1825
α err prob
=
0.05
Power (1-β err prob)
=
.8
Numerator df
=
2
Number of groups
=
12
Noncentrality parameter λ
=
9.7587312
Critical F
=
3.0278979
Denominator df
=
281
Total sample size
=
293
Actual power
=
0.8008869
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Appendix B
Attention check
Individual preferences and situational variables can greatly impact decision
processes. In order to facilitate our research on decision-making we are interested in
knowing certain factors about you, the decision maker. Specifically, we are interested in
whether you actually take the time to read the directions; if not, then some of our
manipulations that rely on changes in the instructions will be ineffective. So, in order to
demonstrate that you have read the instructions, please select the box labeled “Run for
President of the USA” and ignore all of the other choices. Then move on to the next page.
Thank you very much.

Which of these activities do you engage in regularly? (select all that apply)
•
•
•
•
•
•

Protest
Sign petitions
Call representative
Riot
Boycotting
Run for President of the USA
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Appendix C
Policies (readability scores were not displayed in the experiment)
Climate change policies
Simple/For. This initiative is to tighten restrictions on businesses whose practices
are contributing to climate change. They will have to report their usage of all forms of
fuel and energy. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 55.0)
Simple/Against. This initiative is to loosen restrictions on businesses that suffer
due to the spread of climate change information. They will not have to report their usage
of any form of fuel and energy. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 56.7)
Complex/For. This initiative is to upsurge mandates on vendors that are
degrading the environment. They will have to report their expenditure of materials that
lead to radiative forcing such as Chlorofluorocarbons. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score =
30.8)
Complex/Against. This initiative is to slacken circumscriptions on vendors that
have been writhing due to propagation of ecological data. They will not have to report
their expenditure of materials that lead to radiative forcing such as Chlorofluorocarbons.
(Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 26.4)
Taxing corporations policies
Simple/For. This initiative seeks to raise taxes for corporations whose earnings
are above a set dollar amount. The money collected from such a tax will be used to pay
for government programs for the nation's citizens. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score =
56.1)
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Simple/Against. This initiative seeks to lower taxes for corporations whose
earnings are above a set dollar amount. The money saved from such a tax reduction will
be used to expand businesses to create jobs. (Flesch-Kincaid readability score = 56.7)
Complex/For. This initiative seeks to augment corporate tariffs on capital gains
that occupy tariff cohorts exceeding fixed remuneration sums. The tariff monies collected
will be utilized to subsidize government programs for national occupants. (FleschKincaid readability score = 16.1)
Complex/Against. This initiative seeks to curtail corporate tariffs on capital gains
that occupy tariff cohorts exceeding fixed remuneration sums. The tariff monies averted
will be utilized to subsidize commerce expansion to engender occupations. (FleschKincaid readability score = 13.4)
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Tables
Condition

t-test complex vs. simple
(Positive t-value = simple is easier to process)

Issue
Climate Change: Against
Climate Change: For
Corporate Taxes: Against
Corporate Taxes: For

Complex
3.23
4.16
3.90
4.42

Simple
5.32
6.06
6.00
6.13

t
4.16
4.80
4.78
4.16

df
60
60
60
60

p
<.001
<.001
<.001
<.001

Table 1. Mean pretest ratings (N = 62) for processing ease (1 = strongly disagree, 7 =
strongly agree) where higher ratings indicate easier processing and independent samples
t-tests demonstrating that simple versions of all policies, in all cases, are significantly
easier to process.
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Belief-Consistency
Condition

Conditional
Direct Effects

Consistent
Inconsistent
No Preference

-2.16 [-2.73, -1.59]
-1.28 [-1.91, -.66]
-2.13 [-3.25, -1.01]

Consistent
Inconsistent
No Preference

.52 [.39, .64]
-.05 [-.20, .10]
.37 [.16, .59]
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Indirect Effects

XàM

MàY

XàMàY
Consistent
Inconsistent
No Preference

-1.12 [-1.62, -.70]
.07 [-.12, .32]
-.79 [-1.71, -.27]

Table 2. Mediation models using complexity (X) to predict policy favorability (Y)
indirectly through processing ease (M). The same model was run separately for each level
of belief consistency (consistent, inconsistent, and no preference). Numbers denote
unstandardized coefficients with 95% confidence intervals (bootstrapped CIs for indirect
effects). Significant effects appear in bold.
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Simple

Policy Favorability

6

Complex

5
4
3
2
1

Preference-consistent

Preference-inconsistent

No preference

Policy Preference

Figure 1. Preregistered figure of our proposed results for the effects of language
complexity on policy favorability as a function of policy preference consistency.
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7

Policy Favorability

6

Simple

5.78

Complex
5

4.44

4.42

3.68

4

3.19

3

2.48

2
1

Preference-consistent

Preference-inconsistent

No preference

Policy Preference

Figure 2. Observed results for the effects of language complexity on policy favorability
as a function of policy preference consistency.
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Figure 3. Mediation model testing if processing ease mediates the relationship between
issue language complexity and policy favorability. We tested this model separately for
each level of belief consistency (consistent, inconsistent, no preference).
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